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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court is authorized by Section 78-2A-3(h), Utah Code 
Annotated (1953 as. amended) to hear this appeai from the. Second 
District Court for Weber County. This is an action to recover 
under a real estate: contract. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred by ruling in favor of 
Defendant Thomas K. Welch on his Motion for Summary Judgment when 
Defendant Welch had received payments from an assignee of the 
uniform real estate sales contract even though he claims that the 
subsequent assignees abrogated his liability on the contract by 
dealing directly with the sellers. 
The standard of review to be applied to this issue is 
correctness without deference to the trial court because where 
there have been no assessment of the credibility of witnesses or 
their competence to testify, the appellate court is in as good a 
position as the trial court to find the facts based upon the 
written record. In Re Infant Anonvmous, 760 P.2d 916 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988). 
2. Whether the trial court erred by granting summary 
judgment in favor of the Defendants when the ultimate fact of a 
contract change should have been given to the jury. 
The standard of review on this issue is again the 
correctness of the trial court's decision without deference. In 
Re Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
3. Whether summary judgment was appropriate when a question 
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of fact existed concerning the existence of a contract between 
Defendant Welch and Plaintiffs. The standard to be used to 
evaluate the lower court's ruling is whether a question of fact 
raised by the pleadings or affidavits. Grow v. Marwick 
Development. Inc.--. 621 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah 1980). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-21-1 (1953 as amended): 
MIn actions for the recovery of specific real or personal 
property, with or without damages, or for money claimed as 
due upon contract or as damages for breach of contract, or 
for injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jury, 
unless a jury trial is waived or a reference is ordered." 
Utah Code Annotated. Section 79-21-2 (1953 as amended): 
"All questions of fact, where the trial is by jury other 
than those mentioned in the next section (Sec. 78-21-3) are 
to be decided by the jury, and all evidence thereon is to be 
addressed to them except when otherwise provided." 
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-21-3 (1953): 
"All questions of law. including the admissibility of 
evidence, the facts preliminary to such admission, the 
construction of statutes and other writings, and the 
application of the rules of evidence are to be decided by 
the Court and all discussions of law addressed to it. 
Whenever the knowledge of the Court is by law made evidence 
of a fact, the court is to declare such knowledge to the 
jury, who are bound to accept it." 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-40-1 (1953): 
"An action may be brought by any person against another who 
claims an estate or interest in real property or an 
interest or claim to personal property adverse to him. for 
the purpose of determining such adverse claim? 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case 
This is an appeal of the trial court's decision to grant 
summary judgment to Defendant Thomas K. Welch, thus granting him 
dismissal from this case. 
b. Course of the Proceedings and disposition at the trial 
Court 
The Plaintiffs brought this action to reclaim all rents and 
profits under the uniform real-estate contract and to regain 
possession of the contr_act. Thomas Welch cress-claimed 
against Paul W. Stone. Thomas Welch moved for summary 
judgment against the Plaintiffs see3<ing to be dismissed from 
the action citing the personal dealings between the 
Plaintiffs and Defendant Stone as an abrogation of his 
liability on the contract. The Court granted the Motion 
for Summary Judgment. 
c. Relevant Facts 
The Plaintiffs owned a particular piece of property in 
Washington Terrace. Utah where two eightplexes are located. 
By way of a Uniform Real Estate Sales Contract the 
Plaintiffs sold the property to Tom Thorpe who assigned his 
interest to Thomas K. Welch, who in turn sold or assigned 
his interest to Paul Stone. Stone defaulted on a least two 
occasions, Stone later solved the defaults and made an 
additional agreement with the Plaintiffs to pay an 
additional amount to do so. Thomas Welch has received 
payments from Paul Stone in the past, but claims that his 
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liability has been abrogated by the Plaintiffs and Stone 
dealing directly with each other, and agreeing for Stone to pay 
more money than the original contract allowed. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred in granting the Motion for Summary 
Judgment to Thomas Welch and dismissing him from the case. Welch 
had an interest in the property that needed to be determined 
because he had received payments from Defendant Stone, who had 
defaulted. This action was brought to collect all amounts due 
and to regain possession of the property because of the failure 
of Stone to make his payments as required under the contract. 
Since Welch had received money from him. the court needed to 
determine whether any of such sums should have been turned over 
to the Plaintiffs. This undetermined liability presents a cloud 
or potential cloud on the Plaintiffs title and they have a right 
to have that cloud removed. 
Claimants in a quiet title action have the right to a trial 
hy jury to determine their rights and a question upon which the 
whole case depends is whether or not the dealings between the 
Plaintiffs and Stone had abrogated the original contract and 
produced another one. This is an ultimate fact which should have 
been allowed to go to the jury which was requested in this case. 
Instead the trial court dismissed the action without allowing the 
ultimate question of fact to be resolved by the legitimate 
finders of fact in this case. 
Summary judgment was inappropriate because a genuine fact 
existed concerning the existence of a contract between Defendant 
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Welch and Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs never completed the acts 
required by law to forfeit Stone's interest in the property when 
he defaulted, thus no forfeiture took place and Welch's contract 
still binds him. 
ARGUMENT 
I. A PERSON WHO HAS AN INTEREST IN REAL PROPERTY HAS THE 
RIGHT TO BRING AN ACTION TO HAVE A POTENTIAL OR 
PRESENTLY EXISTING CLOUD ON HIS TITLE REMOVED OR 
ENJOINED. RECEIVING PAYMENTS ON THE PROPERTY IN 
QUESTION CONSTITUTES SUCH A CLOUD. 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the right of 
someone who has a claim to property to quiet title against 
present or potential clouds on that title. A11en v. Hanks. 136 
U.S. 300. 310 (1890). The Court in Hanks said: 
" . . . Now what remedy at law is adequate to the relief 
she seeks, and to which she is entitled if these lands 
constitute her separate estate and may not be taken for 
her husband's debts? She is in possession and therefore 
cannot bring ejectment. Must she remain inactive while 
the sale proceeds, and until the purchaser obtains and 
has recorded the marshal's deed to her lands, and then 
bring an action to have the deed canceled and the sale 
set aside, as clouds upon her title? It needs no argument 
to show that the existing levy upon the ape 1 lee's land 
constitutes itself a cloud upon her title, which. if not 
removed and the proposed sale prevented, will injure the 
salable value of the lands. and otherwise affect her 
The Court went on to say: 
"So in Hinchley v. Greanv. 118 Mass. 595, 598: 'The 
Plaintiff is not required to wait until somebody 
obtains a title under a sale before he can seek his 
remedy". 
In the present case the Defendant Welch has received 
payments in the past on the property in question from Defendant 
Stone. Certainly other persons knowing of the receiving of the 
payments by Welch would or could assume that he has some interest 
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in the subject property, if not ownership. Also at issue is the 
ownership of those funds received by other than the Plaintiffs. 
As in Hanks above must the Plaintiffs sit back until the 
Defendants seek action to receive more money from the contract, 
or until they have spent it all and made it harder to collect if 
.it is determined to be owed to them? Or must they wait until 
creditors of Welch or Stone seek after the property to satisfy 
judgments against them before they secure their rights in this 
piece of property? No. the U.S. Supreme Court in a precedent 
setting case which has never teen overturned, has recognized that 
the property owner in a esse like this can and should seek to 
have their property interests adjudicated. 
II. PLAINTIFF'S ACTS TOWARD FORFEITURE OF THE PROPERTY WERE 
NEVER COMPLETED. THUS NO FORFEITURE TOOK PLACE AND 
WELCH WAS NEVER RELEASED FROM HIS OBLIGATIONS ON THE 
CONTRACT. 
In Utah the Courts require the landowner to comply strictly 
with the forfeiture provisions in the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract and to give two distinct types of notices in order to 
forfeit the buyer's interest. For Example the Court of Appeals 
of Utah has said, quoting the Utah Supreme Court 
nIn order to forfeit a purchaser's interest under a 
uniform real estate contract. the seller must comply 
strictly with the notice provisions of the contract. 
The provisions in the uniform real estate contract 
are not self-executing, and to enforce them.it re-
quires some affirmative act on the part of the seller 
to notify the buyer of what specific provision in the 
contract the seller is proceeding under and state what 
the buyer must do to brina the contract current. Grow 
v.Marwick Dev. Inc.. 621 P.2d 1249. 1251-52 (Utah 1980)." 
Adair v. Bracken. 745 P.2d 849, 852 (Utah App. 1987) 
The Adair court went on to say, 
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. . . Furthermore, even if the January letter was 
not insufficient in this respect, it is only one of 
two notices that must be given to the buyers in order 
tc work a forfeiture pursuant to this contract. 
Although it could have sufficed as a notice of default 
required by Paragraph 16-A of the contract it could not 
also serve as a notice of forfeiture, which the sellers 
were required to provide as sufficient notice of their 
election to terminate the- contract and to forfeit buyers' 
interests. Fuhuriman v.Bisseacrer . 13 Utah 2d 379. 375 
P.2d 27 (1962); Leone v.Zuniaa. 84 Utah 417. 34 P.2d 699 
(1934). "Adair, at 745 P.2d 853. 
In the instant case the Plaintiffs only gave one notice in 
each of the defaults, which would have notified the Defendants 
of the Plaintiffs' desire to forfeit the land if not cured 
within the period of time given in the notice. The Plaintiffs 
according to Adair above would also have to give a notice of 
forfeiture to confirm that the Plaintiffs not only had elected to 
take the forfeiture option, but had done so. Otherwise the Utah 
Courts have held that the Plaintiffs would not have complied with 
the contract notice provisions and could not have actually 
forfeited the property under the contract. 
Another requirement to effect a valid forfeiture is to name 
the specific amount to be paid and the performance required of 
the defaulting party, and to give the buyer a reasonable time to 
cure the default First Security Bank of Utah. N.A. v. Maxwell. 
659 P.2d 1078, 1081-82 (Utah 1983). In the present case the 
notice only gave the buyer five days to cure the default, which 
according to other cases is not or may not be a reasonable amount 
of time to cure the dafault. See e.g.. Adair V. Bracken, supra., 
at 853. In Fuhriman v. Bisseaer. 13 Utah 2d 379. 375 P.2d 
(1952). the court allowed 60 days because the notices to the 
Defendant were confusina. and the Defendant was of slow 
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intelligence and would not have had adequate notice even if the 
Plaintiff had closely followed the contract requirements. 
One final principle relative to forfeitures is the often 
repeated phrase that the courts nwill only reluctantly declare a 
forfeiture." Petersen v. Hodcres. 121 Utah 72. 239 P. 2d 181 
(1951). In the instant case the Plaintiff did not allow a 
reasonable amount of time, five days is hardly enough time to 
come up with a great, deal of money. They only gave one notice 
where :he courts clearly require a notice of default or intent to 
declare forfeiture and also a second notice that a forfeiture has 
beer, declared and is in effect. There was no forfeiture in this 
case because of Plaintiff's failure to follow required 
procedures, thus the contract did not end as argued by the 
Defendant Welch and his obligation could not have changed. 
III. BY GRANTING DEFENDANT WELCH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT THE TRIAL COURT EFFECTIVELY DENIED THE 
PLAINTIFFS THEIR RIGHT TO A TRIAL EY A JURY ON AN 
ISSUE INVOLVING THE TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY 
The Courts and the legislature in Utah guarantee a property 
owner the right to a jury trial on issues involving the title to 
real estate. Utah Code Annotated. Section 78-21-1 (1953); Rule 
38 Utah R. Civ. P. Hansen v. Stewart. 761 P.2d 
114. 15 fUtah 1988); Holland v. Wilson. Utah 2d 11. 327 P.2d 250. 
251 (1958). Specifically the Utah Supreme Court said: 
. . . There is a right to a jury trial on all 
questions of fact in any action to determine 
the right to possession of real property. Hoi land 
v. Wilson. 8 Utah 2d 11. 14-15/327 P.2d 250. 252 
(1958); See Utah Code Ann. Section, 78-21-1 (1987); 
Utah R. Civ. P. 38 (a).n Hansen v. Stewart. 761 
P.2d 14. 15 (Utah 1988). 
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In Holland V. Wilson the Court said: 
". . .We are of the opinion that where the question 
is presented as to the right to possession, the right 
to a jury -rial is quaranteed." 321 F.2d at 252. 
Thus it is plain that in a case such as the present one 
which involves the possession of property the Plaintiffs had a 
right to a trial by jury on the question. That right was 
foreclosed by the Court's grant of Welch's summary judgment 
motion. The trial court erred in so denying a trial on an issue 
of fact concerning real property. Plaintiffs brought the action 
not only to declare and receive rents and payments, but also to 
regain possession of the premises. 
Involved in the determination of whether there is right to a 
jury trial is also the question of whether the issues are ones of 
fact, and whether an ultimate fact is to be determined. This 
principle can be seen by the above quotation from the Hansen case 
expounding the right to a jury trial in real property possession 
cases. As the Utah Code and the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
as well as the above cases show, questions of fact are to be 
determined by the jury where one has been requested, and 
questions of law are for the judge. Utah Code Ann. Section. 78-
21-2 (1953).Utah Code Ann. Section 78-21-3 (1953): Rule 38 Utah 
R. Civ. P. 
In the present case there is one fact that needed to be. 
determined upon which the cases of the Plaintiffs and Defendant 
Welch depend for success of failure. The fact of whether a 
contract in fact had been changed or abrogated by the agreement 
of Stone to pay an additional amount of money. An ultimate fact 
is one that should never be determined by the court but in any 
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case tried to a jury or to be tried to a jury would be reserved 
to the jury. Texas Citv Transp. Co. v. Winter. 222 3.W. 541. 542 
(Tex. App. 1920) . Thus, it is clear that the trial court denied 
the Plaintiffs right to a trial by jury on the issue of the 
existence of a contract and the right to possession of the 
p2-operty under the contract. 
IV. SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS NOT APPROPRIATE IN THIS CASE 
BECAUSE THERE WERE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT TO BE 
DETERMINED 3Y THE COURT. 
The Utah Suoreme Court has said: 
summary judgment can only be granted when there 
is no disoute as to a material" fact. Russell v. 
Park City Utah Corp.. 29 Utah 2d 184. 506 ?.2d 
1274 (1373): Controlled Receivables. Inc.v. Harman. 
17 Utah 2d 420. 413 P.2d 807 (1966) . The purpose 
of summary judgment is to save the expense and time 
of the parties and the court, and if the party being 
ruled against could net prevail when the facts are 
looked at most favorably for his position, then 
summary judgment should be aranted. Hoibrook Co. v. 
Adams* Utah. 542. P.2d 191^(19 75). If there is a 
question of fact raised by the pleadings or affidavits, 
the court is precluded from granting summary judgment. 
Hatch v. Sucarhouse Finance Co.. 20 Utah"2d 156. 434 
P.2d 758 (1967). "Grow, Supra.. at 1252. 
In the present case a material fact was whether or not a 
contract existed between the Defendant Welch and the Plaintiffs 
after the transactions between Stone and the Plaintiffs. This is 
a material fact because it is the whole basis for Welch's defense 
that he is no longer liable on the contract, and because this is 
hotly contested by the Plaintiffs. The existence of this one 
fact or question of fact is enough to defeat summary judgment, 
yet the trial court granted it without giving any detailed 
reasonincr for its decision. 
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CONCLUSION 
A person with an interest in real property has a right to 
bring z quiet title action to resolve both present and potential 
clouds on his title. In this case the unresolved question of the 
continuance of the contract between Welch and the sellers and of 
their receiving payments from Stone is a potential cloud. 
Plaintiffs never completed nor followed the requisite acts to 
forfeit the interest of anyone in the real estate involved here. 
Tnus there was no forfeiture and Defendant Welch is still liable 
on the contract. The Plaintiffs had a right to a jury trial on 
the issues in this case because it invoivec the determination of 
possession of property. The question of whether a contract 
continued between Welch and the Plaintiffs was an ultimate fact 
that should have been determined by the jury. Summary judgment 
was not appropriate here because material questions of fact exist 
which need to be resolved by the Court. 
Plaintiffs respectfully ask the Supreme Court to over turn 
the grant of summary judgment in this case and remand for a 
trial by jury on the issues of the existence of a contract 
between Welch and the Plaintiffs. Welch's liability, who should 
have possession of the property, and whether Welch must turn over 
the money he received from Stone to the Plaintiffs. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED thie 26th day of August 1990 
DALETfrr ZORIUS 
Attorney for Plaintiff. Apeliant 
29 South Main 
P.O. Box U 
Bricham City. Utah 84302 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Brief of Apeliant to Cross-Plaintiff. Thomas K. 
Welch's attorney Thomas Vuksinick at Chapman and Cutler. 50 South 
Main Street. Eight Floor. Salt Lake City. Utah 84144. and a copy 
to Cross-Defendant Paul W. Stone's attorney. Donald C. Hughes, 
Jr. at 520 26th Street. Suite 206. Ogden. Utah 84401. this 26th 
day of August 1990. 
DAlirfcT DORIUS 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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ISSUES AND TRIAL 78-21 
78-21-1. Right to jury trial. 
In actions for the recovery of specific real or personal property, with 
without damages, or for money claimed as due upon contract or as damag 
for breach of contract, or for injuries, an issue of fact may be tried by a jui 
unless a jury trial is waived or a reference is ordered. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, Right to jury trial Utah Const. Art. I, S 
Supp., 104-21-1. 10; Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38(a). 
Cross-References. — Demand for jury Waiver of jury trial, Utah Const. Art. h & 
trial, Utah Const. Art. I, Sec. 10; Rules of Civil 10; Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 38(d). 
Procedure, Rule 38(b). 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Consolidation of causes of action. 
Discretion of trial court. 
Powers and functions of jury. 
Quiet title actions. 
Rescission of instruments. 
Right to jury trial. 
Specific performance action. 
Consolidation of causes of action. 
An order for consolidation, for trial of the 
issue of liability, of eleven actions involving 
nineteen plaintiffs claiming damages against 
the defendants did not violate this section. 
Raggenbuck v. Suhrmann, 7 Utah 2d 327,325 
PJ2d 258 (1958). 
Discretion of trial court 
Trial court did not abuse its discretion in re-
fusing to grant plaintiff a jury trial where 
plaintiffs prayer for relief in suit on contract 
demanded an accounting and injunctive relief 
which provided a basis for equity jurisdiction, 
as well as a demand for damages for breach of 
contract. Sweeney v. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 
Utah 2d 113, 417 P.2d 126 (1966). 
Powers and functions of jury. 
As triers of the facts, jurors have right to 
resolve conflicts in evidence and to draw rea-
sonable inferences from facts so found, but they 
are not empowered to decide legal questions or 
to draw conclusions of law except as guided by 
instructions of the court Coray v. Southern 
Pac. Co., 112 Utah 166, 185 P-2d 963 (1947), 
reversed and remanded on other grounds, 335 
U.S. 520, 69 S. Ct 275, 93 L. Ed. 208 (1949). 
Quiet title actions. 
Under this section all issues of fact relating 
to possession of specific real or personal prop-
erty may be determined by a jury unless a jury 
trial is waived, so a plaintiff in an action to 
quiet title to mining claims was entitled to a 
jury trial on issues of fact. Holland v. Wilson, 
Utah 2d 11, 327 P.2d 250 (1958). 
Rescission of instruments. 
In action to rescind instruments by which 
defendant purports to have obtained title to ti 
property of a plaintiff's ward, the fact that oi 
document is the ward's will does not transfer 
into a will contest and the court may refbi 
the request for a jury trial. Johnson v. Joh? 
son, 9 Utah 2d 40, 337 P.2d 420 (1959). 
Right to jury triaL 
Right to have a jury pass upon issues of fa. 
does not include right to have a cause submi 
ted to the jury in hope of a verdict where th 
facts undisputably show that the plaintiff : 
not entitled to relief. Raymond v. Union Pa" 
RJt, 113 Utah 26, 191 P.2d 137 (1948). 
Defendant was entitled to a jury triai on th 
issue of damages, upon his demand, notwith 
standing that the paramount object of th 
plaintiff's action was to secure an injunctio 
and that the claim for damages was but inci 
dental to the injunctive relief sought Valle 
Mortuary v. Fairbanks, 119 Utah 204, 22 
?J2d 739 (1951). 
Where there is substantial contradictory en 
dence on both sides, the case must be given U 
the jury. Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204 
240 PJ2d 491 (1952). 
Upon a subsequent trial of the same cause o 
action, a plaintiff seeking damages is bound by 
his testimony concerning material and observ 
able facts given at the first trial which resuitec 
in a nonsuit on the ground of contributory neg 
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ligence, and cannot materially change such 
testimony in order to offset the defense of con-
tributory negligence. Therefore, the trial court 
does not err in refusing to submit the issue to 
the jury, and in granting the defendant's mo-
tion for a dismissal. Tebbs v. Peterson. 122 
Utah 214, 247 P.2d 897 (1952). 
Specific performance action. 
Granting a jury trial in an action for specific 
performance of contract for the sale of land is 
Utah Law Review. — Right to Civil Jury 
Trial in Utah: Constitution and Statute, Ronan 
£. Degnan, 8 Utah L. Rev. 97. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Jury §§ 39, 
42, 45. 
CJJ&. — 50 CJ.S. Juries §§ 16 to 17, 22. 
AJLR. — Right in equity suit to jury trial of 
counterclaim involving legal issue, 17 
A.L.R.3d 1321. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-21-2. 
Cross-References. — Contents of writings, 
recordings and photographs, determinations 
for jury, Rules of Evidence, Rule 1008. 
Court submission of special findings to jury, 
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 49(a). 
ANALYSIS 
Consolidation of causes of action. 
Drawing of inferences. 
Express warranty. 
Negative testimony. 
Negligence. 
Proximate cause. 
Right to jury trial. 
Consolidation of causes of action. 
The term "the jury" does not mean that one 
and the same jury must try all the issues in a 
case, but means that ail questions offset are to 
be decided by the jury impaneled to try such 
issues. Raggenbuck v. Suhrmann, 7 Utah 2d 
327, 325 P.2d 258 (1958). 
not error where issues agreed upon at pretrial 
involved more than a mere reading and inter* 
pretation of the alleged lease and option; there 
were issues as to whether the husband could, 
as a sole signatory, bind his nonsigning wife, 
whether a memorandum was sufficiently un-
clear as to justify the introduction of evidence 
to clarify it and issues as to intentions of the 
parties in executing the agreement. Corbet v. 
Cox, 30 Utah 2d 361, 517 P.2d 1318 (1974). 
Statute reducing number of jurors as viola-
tive of right to jury trial, 47 A.L.R.3d 895. 
Right to jury trial on motion to vacate judg-
ment, 75 A.LJUd 894. 
Paternity proceedings: right to jury trial, 51 
AXJUth 565. 
Key Numbers. — Jury «- 9 to 10V2, 14(2). 
Court to charge that the jury are the exclu-
sive judges of all questions of fact, Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rule 51. 
Trial by jury or court, Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. Rules 39(a) to (c). 
Verdict may be general or special. Rules of 
Civil Procedure, Rules 49(a), (b), 58A(a). 
Drawing of inferences. 
While juries are given great latitude in de-
ducing inferences from established facts, they, 
nevertheless, are not permitted to base an in-
ference upon an inference, nor may they, with-
out reason, overturn legal presumptions or ar-
bitrarily disregard positive statements of wit-
nesses. Karren v. Bair, 63 Utah 344, 225 P. 
1094 (1924). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
78-21-2. Jury to decide questions of fact. 
All questions of fact, where the trial is by jury, other than those mentioned 
in the next section [§ 78-21-3], are to be decided by the jury, and all evidence 
thereon is to be addressed to them, except when otherwise provided. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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ISSUES AND TRIAL 78-21-3 
Express warranty. 
The question of express warranty is properly 
submitted to the jury where the evidence is 
substantial and supports the essential ele-
ments which the plaintiff is required to prove. 
Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 339, 241 
P.2d 914, 40 A.L.R.2d 273 (1952). 
Negative testimony. 
The weight of negative testimony of wit-
nesses as to the giving of warning signals by 
railroad employees ordinarily is for the jury to 
determine; but when physical conditions and 
the attending circumstances are such as to ren-
der it highly improbable that they could make 
the observation, the rule is otherwise. Seybold 
v. Union Pac. R.R., 121 Utah 61, 239 P.2d 174 
(1951). 
Negligence. 
Generally the degree of care which a person 
must exercise for his own safety is a matter for 
the jury. Eisner v. Salt Lake City, 120 Utah 
675, 238 P.2d 416 (1950). 
Ordinarily, questions of negligence present 
questions of fact to be determined by the jury. 
Poulsen v. Manness, 121 Utah 269, 241 P.2d 
152 (1952). 
Matters cf negligence generally are jury 
questions, unless the evidentiary facts are of 
such conclusive character as to require all rea-
sonable minds to conclude that the ultimate 
fact of negligence does or does not exist. Gibbs 
v. Blue Cab, Inc., 122 Utah 312, 249 P.2d 213 
(1952), afTd, 123 Utah 281, 259 P.2d 294 
(1953). 
Proximate cause. 
The question of proximate cause is a jury 
question. Park v. Moorman Mfg. Co., 121 Utah 
339, 241 P.2d 914, 40 A.L.R.2d 273 (1952). 
Matters of proximate cause generally are 
jury questions, unless the evidentiary facts are 
of such conclusive character as to require all 
reasonable minds to conclude that the ultimate 
fact of proximate cause does or does not exist. 
Gibbs v. Blue Cab, Inc., 122 Utah 312,249 P.2d 
213 (1952), affd, 123 Utah 281, 259 P.2d 294 
(1953). 
Right to jury trial 
Right to have the jury pass upon issues of 
fact does not include the right to have a cause 
submitted to the jury in hope of a verdict where 
the facts undisputably show that the plaintiff 
is not entitled to relief. Ravmond v. Union Pac. 
R.R., 113 Utah 26, 191 P.2d 137 (1948).-
Where there is substantial contradictory evi-
dence on both sides, the case must be given to 
the jury. Finlayson v. Brady, 121 Utah 204, 
240 P.2d 491 (1952). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 75 Am. Jur. 2d Trial § 321. 
CJ.S. — 88 C.J.S. Trial § 203 et seq. 
AXJL — Failure to comply with statute 
regulating travel by pedestrian along highway 
as affecting right to recovery for injuries or 
death resulting from collision with automobile, 
45 AJLR.3d 658. 
Key Numbers. — Trial •» 134 et seq. 
78-21-3. Court to decide questions of law. 
All questions of law, including the admissibility of evidence, the facts pre-
liminary to such admission, the construction of statutes and other writings, 
and the application of the rules of evidence are to be decided by the court and 
all discussions of law addressed to it. Whenever the knowledge of the court is 
by law made evidence of a fact, the court is to declare such knowledge to the 
jury, who are bound to accept it. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, § 1; C. 1943, 
Snpp., 104-21-3. 
Cross-References. — Contents of writings, 
recordings and photographs, determinations by 
court, Rules of Evidence, Rule 1008. 
Judicial notice, Rules of Evidence, Rule 201. 
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QUIET TITLE 78-40-1 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. JUT. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Partition C.J.S. — 68 CJ.S. Partition § 136. 
§ 136. Key Numbers. — Partition *» 87. 
78-39-49. Interest on advances to be allowed. 
Whenever during the progress of the action for partition any disbursement 
shall have been made, under the direction of the court or the judge thereof, by 
a party thereto, interest must be allowed thereon from the time of making the 
same. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, ( 1; C. 1943, Cross-References. — Interest on judg-
Supp., 104-39-49. menu, § 15-1-4. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Partition CJ.S. — 68 CJ.S. Partition § 136. 
§ 131. Key Numbers. — Partition •» 87. 
CHAPTER 40 
QUIET TITLE 
Section 
78-40-1. Action to determine adverse claim 
to property — Authorized. 
78-40-2. Lis pendens. 
78-40-3. Disclaimer or default by defendant 
— Costs. 
78-40-4. Termination of title pending action 
— Judgment — Damages. 
78-40-5. Setoff or counterclaim for improve-
ments made. 
78-40-6. Right of entry pending action for 
purposes of action. 
78-40-7. Order therefor — Liability for inju-
ries. 
78-40-8. Mortgage not deemed a conveyance 
— Foreclosure necessary. 
Section 
78-40-9. 
78-40-10. 
78-40-11. 
78^0-12. 
78-40-13. 
Alienation pending action not to 
prejudice recovery. 
Actions respecting mining claims 
— Proof of customs and usage 
admissible. 
Temporary injunction in actions in-
volving title to mining claims. 
Service of summons and conclusive-
ness of judgment 
Judgment on default — Court must 
require evidence — Conclusive-
ness of judgment 
78-40-1. Action to determine adverse claim to property — 
Authorized. 
An action may be brought by any person against another*who claims an 
estate or interest in real property or an interest or claim to personal property 
adverse to him, for the purpose of determining such adverse claim. 
History: L. 1951, ch. 58, $ 1; C. 1943, 
Supp., 104-40-1. 
Cross-References. — Action brought in 
county where property situated, § 78-13-1. 
Allowance for improvements made under 
color of title, §5 57-6-1 et seq.f 78-40-5. 
Jurisdiction in district courts, Utah Const., 
Art. VIE, Sec. 5; § 78-3-4. 
Limitations of actions, § 78-12-1 et seq. 
Tax sales of real property, $ 59-10-29 et seq. 
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i . . . . J I nui.fc3 Or CIVIL I'KOCfe'DUKti 
an advisory jury or, with tha consent of both parties, may order a trial with a 
Jury whose verdict has the same effect aa i f trial by jury had been a matter of 
right. 
CoespUer'o Nolee. — Thia rule la similar to 
Rula 39, P.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Advisory jury. 
—Equity. 
Trial by consent. 
—Equity. 
r r ^ 0 0 « * «Kr«<*ed verdict 
Trial by court. 
—Waiver of court trial. 
-Wal i rar of jury trial. 
Trial by Jury. 
—Orant of Jury trial. 
——Absence of demand. 
—Right. 
- — Q u i e t title •«u o n . 
Cited. 
—Equity. 
Whan there is a demand for a jury trial in an 
equity eaaa, tha Jury will asrva only la an advi-
sory capacity unlaw bath parties have daarly 
soneented to accept a Jury verdict Romrell v. 
nana Plrat Nat l Bank, 611 P.2d 392 <Uuh 
1980). 
Trial court did not commit prejudicial error 
by allowing a Jury ta ait In an equity proceed-
In* wbara tha jury was retained merely aa an 
advisory Jury to consider tha sola question of 
tha reasonableness ef plaintiffs reliance on de-
fendant's act. Tolboe Conatr. Co v. Staber Pav-
ing a Conatr. Co., 602 P 2d 643 tUtah 1984). 
Tr ia l by consent 
—Equity. 
Motion for directed verdict 
Where tha case was essentially one in equity 
but tha partlee and court appeared to have con-
sented to presenting their caee ta a Jury whose 
verdict would have "the same effect a* if trial 
by jurv had bean s matter of riifht," under Sub-
division <c>. the determination of whether a di-
rected verdict wss proper waa to be tooted by 
the same rulee gowning cases at law. Wll|«rd 
v. Milne Inv. Co. v. Cos. 660 P.W 607 I Utah 
1976). 
Tr ial by court 
—Waiver of court trial . 
Even though former statute providing for 
trial by court in abeence of demand for jury 
waa couched in mandatory terms, and a party 
might have an absolute right to have the is-
sue* tried by tha court, the right could bo 
waived, aa by proceeding to trial before a jury. 
Houston Real Estate Inv. Co. v. H.*hler, 47 
Utah 216. 162 P. 726 I I9 I6 I . 
—Waiver of Jury trial. 
WIM re it did not appear thnt any demand for 
a jury trial wae made, or that any objection or 
exception waa made at any time during trial 
against right of the court to try the rase with-
out a Jury, it would bo presumed on appeal that 
a trial by jury waa waived. Perago v. Dodge. 9 
Utah3.33 P. 221 (1693).efTd. 163 U S . 160.16 
A C ! 971.41 L Ed. I I S f 18961. 
Tr ial by jury. 
—Orant of Jury trial. 
——Abeence of demand. 
Court did not abuse Its dlNcreiion in granting 
Jury trial to defendant, under this rula, over 
plaintiffs objection* although defendant had 
not made proper demand for jury trial under 
Rula 38. where plaintiff waa not prejudiced 
thereby. Jamas Mfg. Ce. v. Wilson. 16 Utah 2d 
210. 390 P2d 127 (1964). 
- R i g h t 
Quiet title action. 
This rule gives the right to have any legal 
ieaue of fact tried by a jury upon proper de-
mand, and plaintiff in an action to qun-t title to 
mining claims wsr entitled to e jury trial on 
lesues offset Holland v. Wilson. 8 Utah 2d 11. 
327 P.2d 260 II96HI. 
Cited In Randall v. Tracy Collins It-net Co.. 
6 Utah 2d 16, 306 P2d 4H0 (lUfVni. 
I fat 
UTAH RULES OP CIVIL PROCEDURE R u l e 4 0 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. I d . - 47 Am. Jur 2d Jury I I 67, of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, autheris-
68; 76 Am. Jur. 2d Trial I 319 at eeq. ing it to order jury trial notwithstanding 
C J . & - 50 C J a Juries I I 96 to 105, 68 party's failure to make seasonable demand for 
C J S Trial I I 20. 203. 547 at eeq.
 J t t r y . ft A L R Fed. 217. 
A . U R . - Whan does jeapudy atuch in a Key Number*. - Jury a- 26; Trial e - 10. 
non-Jury trial. 49 A.L.R 3d 1039.
 1 3 4 3 6 7 e t 
Discretion of district court under Rule 39(b) 
Rule 40. Assignment of cases for trial; continuance. 
(a) Order and precedence. The district courts shall provide by rule for 
the placing or actions upon the trial calendar (1) without request of the parties 
or (2) upon request of a party and notice to the other parties or (3) in such 
other manner as the courts may deem expedient. Precedence shall be given to 
actions entitled thereto by statute. 
lb) Postponement of the tr ial . Upon motion of a party, the court may in 
its discretion, and upon such terms as may be just, including the payment of 
costs occasioned by such postponement, postpone a trial or proceeding upon 
good cause shown. If the motion is made upon the ground of the absence of 
evidence, such motion shall also set forth the materiality of the evidence 
expected to be obtained and ahall show that due diligence has been used to 
procure it. The court may also require the party seeking the continuance to 
state, upon affidavit or under oath, the evidence he expects to obtain, and if 
the adverse party thereupon admits that such evidence would be given, and 
that it may be considered as actually given on the trial, or offered and ex-
cluded as.improper, the trial shall not be postponed upon that ground. 
<c) Tak ing testimony of witnesses present I f required by the adverse 
party, the court shall, as a condition to such postponement, proceed to have 
the testimony of any witness present taken, in the same msnner as if at tha 
trial; and tha testimony so taken may be read on the trial with the same 
effect, and subject to tha same objections that may be made with respect to a 
deposition under the provisions of Rule 32(c)(1) and (2) (Rule 32 (cX3)(A) and 
Compiler's Notes. — Following ths amend- Subdivision (a) of this ruls is similar to Rule 
ment of Rule 33, enecUve January 1.1967. tha 40. F R C P 
reference ta Rule tfkcN 11 and (Si, at the end of Croea-ReferoAcea. — Amendment af plead* 
Subdivision <e>, should now be to Rule Inge to conform to evidence, continuance upoa, 
33tcM3KAl and tBl. Rule 15(b) 
NCTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Need 
» . . Cited. 
Postponement. 
— Ahm»tM-e of porty Postponement. 
— IMwrrtlon of <iiiirt 
- l l l l l l l l l i t y <»f UMIIMH I to attend trial. —Absence of parly. 
Unavoidable ill* nice. Continuance would not be granted because 
— New theory of :a«e. of sbeencs of a party, unleie he was a material 
— Procedural delays witnese. end. if so, the (sets espected to be 
Supporting| affVlevits *^ —eMippurting affidavits proved by him had ta be stated under eath, 
—Unavailable wi- ness. unlsss the oath waa waived. Jt was alsa neres* 
Lack of diligence, ssry that party had used due diligence ta be 
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Rule 38 UTAH RULES OP CIVIL 
PART VI. 
TRIALS. 
Rule 38. Jury trial of right. 
(a) Right preserved. The right of trial by jury as declared by the constitu-
tion or • • given by statute shall be preserved to the parties. 
Cb) Demand. Any party may demand a trial by Jury of any issue triable of 
right by a jury by paying the statutory jury fee and serving upon the other 
parties a demand therefor in writing at any time after the commencement of 
the action and not later than 10 days after the service of the last pleading 
directed to such issue. Such demand may be endorsed upon a pleading of the 
party. 
(c) Same: Specification of issues. In his demand a party may specify the 
Issues which he wishes so tried; otherwise he shall be deemed to have de-
manded trial by jury for all the issues so triable. If he has demanded trial by 
jury for only some of the issues, any other party, within 10 daya after service 
of the demand or such lesser time as the court may order, may serve a demand 
for trial by jury of any other or all of the issues of fact in the action. 
(d) Waiver. The failure of a party to pay the statutory fee, to serve a de-
mand aa required by this rule and to file it aa required by Rule 5(d) constitutes 
• waiver by him of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury made aa herein 
provided may not be withdrawn without the consent of the parties. 
(Amended, effective Jan. 1, 1987.) 
Amendment Notes. — Tht IMtg amend* 
men! oubetituted "10 days after the service of 
ths loot pleading directed la tudt Issus" for 
••ball be nied by nils of court In which UM 
actioe to pending" in the first sentence of Sub-
division (bl. 
• CsmpueVa N o t e s . - This nils to eimilsrte 
* Is Si. FJLC.P. 
Croee-Refereneee. — Constitutional guar* 
sntee. Uteh Const, Art. I. 8ec. 10. 
Discretion to order Jury trial In sbeenee sf 
demand, Rule 3*tbh 
Fee for filing demsnd, II 78-3-16 5. 78-424. 
Fees sf Jurors, I 216-1 et esq. 
Jury provieiene generally. I 76-46-1 et esq. 
Statutory right Is Jury trial, I 7t 21-1. 
ANALYSIS 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Demand. 
Damage*. 
Demsnd. 
—Time. 
Right | 
—Appeal from Industrie! commlaaion. 
—Court'* discretion. 
Waiver. 
—Failure to make written demand 
Cited. 
Damagea. 
There ie no right to e Jury trial on the iaeue 
ef damagee once <Mnult haa been entered. 
Arnica Mut. In* Co. v. Schettler. 76S P.2d 960 
(Utah Cl App 19H9I. 
—Absence. 
Court did not sbuee its discretion in granting 
Jury trial to defendant under Rule 39(b) over 
plaintiff* objection* although defendant had 
not mads proper demsnd for Jury trial under 
thia nils, where plaintiff wa* not prejudiced 
thereby. Jamee Mfr Co. v Wilton. 1ft Utah 2d 
210. 390 P2d 127 (19641. 
—Time. 
Trial court did not ehu*« ita diwmtiun in 
denying party'a request for a Jury trial made 
four daya prior to trial in violation of diatrtct 
court practice rule requiring auch request to be 
made at leant 10 daya twfore trial. Dyeon v. 
Aviation Office of Am.. Inc.. 693 I'2d 143 
(Utah 19791 (decided prior to 1986 amend-
ment). 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE Rule 39 
Right preserved. 
—Appeal from IndustHsl commlaaion. 
This trial rule la not applicable to trial do 
novo In the district court on sppeal from Indus-
trial commission's decision on s ses dlecriml* 
nation In employment case. Beehive Medical 
Elece.. Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n. 663 P 2d 63 
(Utah 1978). 
—Court's dfacretfon. 
In circumstances where doubt eiiste aa to 
whether o csuee should be regarded as one in 
equity or one In lew, wherein ths party can 
Inatot on s Jury ss a matter of right, ths trial 
court should have asms discretion and may et* 
smine the nature ef the rights samrted and the 
remedie* sought in the light of the facta of ths 
caae to aecertein which predominates end, 
from that eVtennlr.at.on, make Ihs spprepriate 
order sa to s Jury sr nonjury trial. Corbet v. 
Cos. 30 Utah 2d 361. 617 P.2d 1316 (19741. 
Waiver. 
—Failure to make written demand. 
Failure to make a written demand for a Jury 
trial upon the opposing party waives mny error 
in a court* failure to grant a Jury trial. Gaeoer 
v. Home. 657 P2d 164 (Utah 1976). 
Cited in Stickle v. Union Pac. R.R.. 122 
Uteh 477, 251 P.2d 667 (1962); Beet v. Huber. 
1 Uteh 2d 177.281 P.2d 206 < 19661; f 
Stewart. 761 P.2d 14 (Utah 1968). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. 4ur. 1 4 . - 4 7 Am. Jur. 2d Jury i i 10. 
67 to 69. 71, 81. 82. 84 te 89 
CJ.S. - 60 CJB. Juries II 10. 64 te 113. 
A.L.R. — Obtaining Jury trial in eminent 
domain; waiver. 12 A.L.R.M 7. 
Right la equity suit te Jury Uisl of counter-
claim Involving legsl ieoue. 17 A L R 3d 1321. 
Issues In garnishment ss triable to court or 
to Jury. 19 A LR3d 1393. 
Statute reducing number of Jurors ss viola* 
tlvs of right to trial by Jury. 47 A.L.R.3d 898. 
Authority of state court to order Jury trial la 
civil case where Jury ha* been waived or not 
demanded by parties. 9 A.LRdth 1041. 
Right to Jury trial In stockholder** derivative 
action. 32 A.LR4th t i l l . 
Right to Jury trial in sctlon for declaratory 
relief In state court. S3 A.L.R.40) 146. 
Jury trial waiver as binding an Ister ststo 
civil trial, 48 A L R 4th 747. 
Paternity proceedings: right te Jury trial. 61 
A L.R-4tb 666. 
Right to Jury trial in action for retaliatory 
discharge from employment, 62 A.L.R.4U) 
1141. 
Right to Jury trial in etete court divorce pro-
ceeding*. 66 A L R 4th 966. 
Vslidity sf tow sr nils rsquiring stste court 
perty who request* Jury trisl In civil case to 
psy coete associated with Jury, 68 A L R.4th 
343 
Rule 38 sf Federal Rule* ef Civil Procedure: 
wsived right to Jury trisl ss revived ay 
smended sr supplements! plssdJags, 16 A.L.R. 
Fed 764 
Key Numbers. — Jury e» 10, 26 to 28. 
Rule 39. Trial by jury or by the court. 
(a) By jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as provided in Rule 38, 
the action shall.be designated upon the register or actions as a jury action. The 
trial of all issues so demanded shall be by jury, unless 
(1) The parties or their attorneys of record, by written stipulation filed 
with the court or by an oral stipulation made in open court and entered in 
the record, consent to trial by the court sitting without a jury, or 
(2) The court upon motion or of its own initiative finds that a right of 
trial by jury of some or all of those issues does not exist, or 
(3) Either party to the issue fails to appear at the trial. 
(b) By the court Issues not demanded for trial by jury as provided in Rule 
38 shall be tried by the court; but, notwithstanding the failure of a party to 
demand a jury in an action in which such a demand might have been made of 
right, the court in its discretion upon motion may order a trial by a jury of any 
or all issues. 
(c) Advisory Jury and trial by consent In all actions not triable of right 
by a jury the court upon motion or of its own initiative mny try any isnoc with 
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L. R. Gardiner, Jr. (A-1148) 
Thomas R. Vuksinick (A-3341) 
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER 
50 South Main Street 
Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 533-0066 
RECEIVED 
MAR 2 71989 
DALE M. DORIUS 
Attorney at Law 
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas K. Welch 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
NICK FAULKNER and KARYL 
FAULKNER, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TOM C. THORPE, PAUL W. 
STONE and THOMAS K. WELCH, 
Defendants. 
THOMAS K. WELCH, 
Cross-plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAUL W. STONE, 
Cross-defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF \dJfA 
AFFIDAVIT OF PAUL W. STONE 
Civil No. 2698-88 
ss 
Paul W. Stone, being first sworn, deposes and says as 
followss 
^y^.H^si 
"V; 
1. I am Paul W. Stonef also known as Paul Stone, and am a 
defendant and cross-defendant in this action* 
2. On or about November 22, 1978, Thomas K. Welch, also 
known as Tom Welch, assigned to me his buyer's interest in a 
Uniform Real Estate Contract dated April 8, 1978, between Nick 
and Karyl Faulkner as sellers and Tom C. Thorpe as buyer. A 
true and correct copy of the Uniform Real Estate Contract dated 
April 8, 1978, between the Faulkners and^  Thorpe is attached as 
Exhibit "A." A true and correct copy of the written assignment 
of contract bearing my signature is attached as Exhibit "B." 
3. The real property that is the subject of the Uniform 
Real Estate Contract is comprised of two eight plexes located in 
Washington Terrace, Utah. 
4. After the buyer's interest in the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract was assigned to me I began making payments directly to 
the Faulkners as sellers through Weber Valley Bank, the escrow 
agent under the contract. 
5. On July 1, 1981, Arealtech Realty (property management) 
owned by Lynn Muirbrook was hired to manage the apartments. The 
management agreement was terminated on or about February 1, 
1982. 
6. My November 1981 payment to the Faulkners was late. 
Shortly after November 30, 1981, I received a notice of default 
bearing that date from the Faulkners through the escrow agent. 
-2-
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The notice demanded that the default be cured and stated that in 
the event the default was not cured, the Faulkners had elected 
remedy "A" under paragraph 16 of the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. That paragraph provides under remedy "AH that in the 
event default is not cured within 5 days after notice, the 
buyer's interest under the contract is forfeited to the seller 
as liquidated damages. This default was cured. A true and 
correct copy of the notice of default is attached as 
Exhibit MC.M 
7. My January 1982 payment was late. Shortly after 
January 25, 1982, I received notice of default bearing that date 
from the Faulkners, again through the escrow agent. The notice 
demanded that the default be cured by February 1, 1982, and 
again elected the remedy of forfeiture under paragraph 16A of 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract in the event the default was 
not cured. I was unable to cure the default by February 1, 
1982. A true and correct copy of that notice of default is 
attached as Exhibit "D.M 
8. In the first part of February 1982 I received a letter 
dated February 1, 1982, from Weber Valley Bank as the escrow 
agent under the Uniform Real Estate Contract. That letter 
notified me, among other things, that the escrow had been term-
inated and the documents held in escrow had been delivered to 
the Faulkners. A true and correct copy of that letter is 
attached as Exhibit "E." 
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9. On or about February 1, 1982, the Faulkners sent a 
letter to the tenants of the real property being purchased under 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract that advised them to remit 
their rental payments to the Faulkners as owners of the 
property. 
10. The February 1982 rentals that had been collected by 
me and the management company that had been managing the real 
property for me were paid over to the Faulkners, and Nick 
Faulkner collected some of the February 1982 rentals himself. A 
copy of a list of those rental payments in Nick Faulkner's hand-
writing is attached as Exhibit MF.M 
11. I also turned my rent ledger for the real property 
over to the Faulkners in February 1982. 
12. Between February 1, 1982, and May 27, 1982, I entered 
into negotiations with the Faulkners in an effort to regain my 
interest in the forfeited real property. During those negoti-
ations Nick Faulkner repeatedly said that the Faulkners owned 
the property and were entitled to the rents. During this time 
the Faulkners collected all of the rents from the real property 
in an amount totaling over $12,000. The rents collected are 
summarized in the document written and signed by Nick Faulkner, 
a true and correct copy of which is attached as Exhibit "G." 
13. At no time did Thomas K. Welch or Tom C. Thorpe par-
ticipate in my negotiations with the Faulkners to regain my 
-4-
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2 
3 
11
 interest in the real property, nor were they mentioned as part 
ill 
of the negotiations. 
5II 
14. In late May 1982, the Faulkners and I reached an 
fil 
agreement pursuant to which I would regain my interest in the 
7ll 
real property on the terms set forth in the Uniform Real Estate 
8ll 
Contract except as changed by an agreement dated May 28, 1982. 
9|' 
A true and correct copy of the May 28, 1982, agreement con-
taining the changes is attached as Exhibit "H." Among the 
llll 
significant changes in the agreement was the imposition of a 
$7,000 "penalty" to be added to the principal balance due and an 
additional $3,000 added to the principal in lieu of immediate 
payment of $1,500 in "out of pocket costs" that the Faulkners 
required be paid as a condition to regaining my interest in the 
real property. The terms regarding the Faulkners1 remedy in the 
event of default were also changed. Under the new agreement 
between the Faulkners and myself, -in the event I was unable to 
make the payments when due, the Faulkners1 sole remedy was for-
feiture of the buyer's interest. There was to be no , other 
remedy under the new purchase agreement. See paragraphs 
numbered 3, 4 and 5 of the May 28, 1982, agreement, attached as 
Exhibit "H." 
15. A new escrow agreement was entered into with Weber 
Valley Bank, the Faulkners and me as part of the new purchase 
agreement. A true and correct copy of the escrow agreement is 
attached as Exhibit "I." 
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16. As part of the new agreement with the Faulkners, I 
also required that they notify the tenants of the real property 
that I had regained my interest in the property. To that endf 
Nick Faulkner signed and delivered to me a notice to be passed 
on to the tenants dated May 27, 1982# a true and correct copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit "J." I then began making payments 
into the new escrow account as provided in my agreement with the 
Faulkners. 
17. In June 1988, the Faulkners initiated the suit seeking 
to recover the possession of the real property and to collect 
payments toward the balance owed under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. 
DATED this 2J_ day of March, 1989. 
CZsts^ 
1 W. Stone 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this of/ day of March, 
1989. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that the foregoing Affidavit of Paul W. 
Stone, A/K/A Paul Stone was served upon the parties hereto by 
mailing a true and correct copy thereof this day of March, 
1989, to the following: 
Dale M. Dorius, Esq. 
P. 0. Box U 
29 South Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Donald C. Hughes, Jr. 
520 26th Street, Suite 206 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendant Paul W. Stone 
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L. R. Gardiner, Jr. (A-1148) 
Thomas R. Vuksinick (A-3341) 
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER 
50 South Main Street 
Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 533-0066 
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas K. Welch 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
NICK FAULKNER and KARYL 
FAULKNER, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TOM C. THORPE, PAUL W. 
STONE and THOMAS K. WELCH, 
Defendants. 
THOMAS K. WELCH, 
Cross-plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAUL W. STONE, 
Cross-defendant. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 88090-2698 
The motion of defendant Thomas K. Welch for summary-
judgment in his favor and against the defendants and the related 
[motion of defendant Welch to strike certain portions of the 
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affidavit of Nick Faulkner having been submitted to the Court 
for consideration pursuant to Rule 4-501, Chapter 4 of the 
Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration, and the Court 
having considered the memorandums and affidavits filed by the 
parties and having rendered its written ruling on these motions 
dated July 12, 1989, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that Paragraph 5 of the 
Affidavit of Nick Faulkner is stricken, except the portion 
thereof where plaintiff Faulkner admits that the plaintiffs took 
possession of the property, and summary judgment is hereby 
granted in favor of the defendant Thomas K. Welch and against 
the plaintiffs Nick Faulkner and Karyl Faulkner and the 
plaintiffs' complaint is dismissed with prejudice as against the 
defendant Thomas K. Welch. 
DATED this //. 3^ay of ,/ , 1989. 
J BY THE COURT: 
The Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that the foregoing Summary Judgment was 
served upon the parties hereto by mailing a true copy thereof, 
postage prepaid, this / / day of July, 1989, to the following 
counsel of record: 
Dale M. Dorius, Esq. 
P.O. Box U 
29 South Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Donald C. Hughes, Jr. 
520 26th Street, Suite 206 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendant Paul W. Stone 
DALE M. DORIUS #0903 
Attorney for: 
P.O. Box U 
29 South Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
723-5219 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NICK FAULKNER and KARYL ( 
FAULKNER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TOM C. THORPE, PAUL W. 
STONE and THOMAS K. WELCH, 1 
Defendants. 1 
THOMAS K. WELCH, 
Cross-Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAUL W. STONE, 
Cross-Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF NICK FAULKNER 
AND KARYL FAULKNER 
IN OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 26S8-88 
NICK FAULKNER and KARYL FAULKNER being first duly sorn on 
their oath, depose and say as follows: 
1. Plaintiffs are the sellers of certain real property 
under a certain real estate property contract, 
2. Defendants are the original buyer and successive 
assignees of the buyer's interest under the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. 
3. Plaintiffs brought this action against all the 
Defendants in order to recover all installments alleged to be due 
under the contracts. 
4. Defendant WELCH, an assignee of the original Uniform 
Real Estate Contract, has moved for Summary Judgment on the 
grounds his obligations under the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
had been terminated by previous forfeitures. 
5. Plaintiffs did not make an election of remedies and an 
election of remedies never took place. The position of Defendant 
WELCH has not changed and Plaintiffs have never received title 
back from the escrow; therefore, the requirements of forfeiture 
were not completed and the contract continued. Plaintiff entered 
into possession for a while but no forfeiture or recision took 
place and the contract did not end. Defendant WELCH is in the 
same possession as he was before the default had occurred and 
before any notices had been sent. The affiants herein never 
treated the contract as void and did reinstate the contract 
whenever the default was cured. 
2 
DATED this day of May, 1989. 
NICK FAULKNER 
KARYL FAULKNER 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of May, 
1989. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: Residing at _ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Affidavit of Nick Faulkner and Karyl Faulkner to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment to Cross-Plaintiff THOMAS 
K. WELCH'S attorney, THOMAS VUKSINICK at Chapman and Cutler, 50 
South Main Street, Eighth Floor, Salt Lake City, UT 84144, and a 
copy to Cross-Defendant PAUL W. STONE's attorney, DONALD C. 
HUGHES, JR. at 520 26th Street, Suite 206, Ogden, UT 84401, 
this 23rd day of May, 1989. 
DALE M. DORIUS 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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DAL! M. DORIUS #0903 
Attorney for: 
P.O. Box U 
29 South Main Street 
Brighom City, Utah 84302 
7235219 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
NICK FAULKNER and KARYL ( 
FAULKNER, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TOM C. THORPE, PAUL W. 
STONE and THOMAS K. WELCH, 1 
Defendants. 1 
THOMAS K. WELCH, 
Cross-Plaintiff, 
vs.. 
PAUL W. STONE, 
Cross-Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM 
IN OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
[ Civil No. 2638-88 
Plaintiffs, NICK FAULKNER and KARYL FAULKNER, submit the 
following Memorandum in Objection to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment: 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant WELCH is still liable under the contract because 
Plaintiffs never received title back to the property and the 
contract was reinstated. 
Defendant is essentially arguing as part of his theory that 
the Plaintiffs' election of remedies on the original contract 
ended the contract and thus his liability. In answer, the 
Plaintiffs argue that Ha change in remedies does not bring about 
an election of remedies unless the change involves a prejudice to 
the opposing party." Keesee vs. Fetzek, 681 P.2d 600, 603 (Idaho 
App. 1984); Commercial Centre Realty Co. v. Superior Court, 7 
Cal.2D 121, 59 P.2d 978, 982 (1936); Accord Slay vs. Burnett 
Trust, 143 Tex. 621, 187, S.W. 2d 377 (1945). And "where no 
advantage has been gained or no detriment has been occasioned, 
there is no election." Kessee, supra, at 603; Gridley v. Ross, 31 
Idaho 693, 701-02, 217 P. 989,991 (1923). Thus, as the action 
caused no prejedice to Defendant's rights because the default was 
cured and the contract reinstated, no election of remedies took 
place-. 
In another case where the vendor had given a notice of 
cancellation or default, the court said: 
"In the absence of facts which justify the application 
of the election of remedies doctrine, the vendor under 
a contract for deed may withdraw his . . . notice of 
cancellation before the redemption period has expired." 
In the instant situation the Plaintiff withdrew his desire for 
forfeiture before all the steps were finished to forfeit the 
debtor's interest and the agreement continued as before. This 
situation does not involve facts justify the application of the 
election or other similar doctrine, so the Plaintiff had the 
2 
right to withdraw his intention to forfeit the debtor's 
possession. 
Notifying the assignee of his decision to forfeit the 
property if the default was not cured and then reinstating the 
contract without receivina any documents of title or contract 
from the escrow holder did not end the contract and could not 
prejudice the rights of Defendant WELCH- Defendant WELCH was in 
the same position he had been in before the default had occurred 
and before the notice had been sent. As the court discussed in 
Kessee, supra, at 604, where in case of forfeiture of the 
debtor's possession, the contract instructed the escrow holder to 
return all papers upon the seller's demand and the seller never 
made sucn a demand, the provision did not apply. Thus no such 
forfeiture was held to have occurred, just as in this case no 
forfeiture occurred because the default was cured and the 
Plaintiff never received the documents back from escrow. Any 
forfeiture must strictly follow the contract. Kessee, supra.. 
Thus since the documents were never returned to Plaintiff, no 
forfeiture occurred. 
Also as the court commented in Kessee, Supra. at 604, where 
a provision for forfeiture was construed requiring that the 
seller declare a forfeiture and treat the contract as null and 
void. "The sellers have never treated the contract as a nullity. 
Moreover, the buyer's position is that the contract was 
3 
terminated, not that it was avoided. Consequently this provision 
is inapplicable." In the instant case the seller never treated 
the contract as void, he reinstated it whenever the default was 
cured. Also Defendant WELCH argues just as the defendant in 
Kessee that the contract was terminated, not that it was avoided, 
consequently the forfeiture provision does not apply. 
Defendant WELCH cites Boswell v. Lyon, 401 N.E.2d 735 (Ind. 
App. 1980) for the proposition that if an assignee and a seller 
under a real estate contract make an agreement changing the 
assignor's rights, his obligation to the seller is extinguished. 
Although one holding does appear to favor WELCH the case is full 
of statements and a fact situation that tends to favor Plaintiff. 
The case involved one similar to this where a seller was seeking 
to hold a series of assignees liable on the default of the 
contract provisions. Assuming that the second agreement entered 
into between Plaintiff and STONE only changed STONE'S amount he 
was required to pay, and did not obligate WELCH to pay any more 
than the original contract price, the holding in Boswell, that an 
agreement between the assignee and the seller which changes the 
obligation of the assiqnor discharges the obligation of the 
assignor is not applicable. 
If the above assumption is correct then as in Boswell, 
supra, at 745 "The record before us yields no hint of a change in 
the obligation ofM WELCH and nThe second assignment . . . merely 
4 
gave to" WELCH "a new and added security in the form of" STONE. 
And " . . . The obligation of,f WELCH "not having been altered . . 
. he remains liable as a matter of law." 
Anologous to the present situation may be that of recission 
of similar contracts by the vendor. In Jacobsen, 79 Cal. Rptr. 
301 (1969) the court held that the 
"vendors did not elect to rescind the sales contract 
upon the vendees default where they made no attempt to 
return payments made by purchasers even though vendors 
went into possession after purchasers default and 
vendor's successors brought a quiet title action." 
In the instant case the Plaintiff went into possession for awhile 
and no forfeiture or recission took place and the contract did 
not end. 
CONCLUSION 
No election of remedies took place. The position of 
Defendant WELCH was not changed by the reinstatement of the 
contract and Plaintiff never received title back from escrow; 
therefore, the requirements for forfeiture were not complete and 
the contract continued and that entering into possession as in 
Jacobsen did not end the contract. 
DATED this day of May, 1989. 
DALE M. DORIUS 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
29 South Main 
P. O. Box U 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
3 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Plaintiff's Memorandum in Objection to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment to Cross-Plaintiff THOMAS K. WELCH'S 
attorney, THOMAS VUKSINICK at Chapman and Cutler, 50 South Main 
Street, Eighth Floor, Salt Lake City, UT 84144, and a copy to 
Cross-Defendant PAUL W. STONE'S attorney, DONALD C. HUGHES, JR. 
at 520 26th Street, Suite 206, Ogden, UT 84401, this 23rd day 
of May, 1989. 
DALE M. DORIUS 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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50 South Main Street 
Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
NICK FAULKNER and KARYL 
FAULKNER, his wife, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
TOM C. THORPE, PAUL W. 
STONE and THOMAS K. WELCH, 
Defendants. 
THOMAS K. WELCH, 
Cross-plaintiff, 
vs. 
PAUL W. STONE, 
Cross-defendant. 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFFS' 
MEMORANDUM IN OBJECTION 
TO DEFENDANT WELCH'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 2698-88 
Preliminary Statement 
Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to defendant Thomas 
K. Welch's motion for summary judgment does not contain a 
statement of facts that plaintiffs contend are disputed. 
1 
21 
311 Accordingly, M[a]ll material facts set forth in the movant's 
4 statement [of undisputed £acts] shall be deemed admitted for 
5 the purpose of summary judgment . . . ." Rule 4-501(5), 
6 Chapter 4, Judicial Council Rules of Judicial Administration, 
7 Indeed, the facts as stated in Welch's opening memorandum 
8 cannot be disputed. The most significant undisputed facts 
9 are: (1) Welch assigned the buyer's interest under the Uniform 
10 Real Estate Contract to defendant Paul W. Stone; (2) as a 
11 result of Stone's default under the Uniform Real Estate 
12 Contract, plaintiffs sent a notice of default in which they 
13 selected forfeiture and liquidated damages as their remedy if 
14 the default was not cured; (3) when the default was not cured, 
15 plaintiffs terminated the escrow, received the documents in 
16 escrow,1 and sent notice to Stone that the escrow had been 
17 terminated; (4) plaintiffs took possession of the property 
18 without suit and began collecting rents; and (5) some months 
19 later plaintiffs entered into a new agreement with Stone which 
21 
*In their affidavit and memorandum plaintiffs seem to say 
22 that they did not receive the escrowed documents. However, 
plaintiffs previously stated in their answers to 
23 interrogatories that they did receive the documents which had 
been placed in escrow. See Answer to Interrogatory No. 3, 
24 
Defendant Welch's First Set of Interrogatories to Plaintiffs, 
attached to Welch's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Strike 
25 Plaintiffs Affidavit, filed herewith. The original Uniform 
Real Estate Contract did not require that either the seller or 
26 buyer place any documents into escrow, 
28 
1 
2] 
3 contained terms different from and which were more burdensome 
4 than those of the original Uniform Real Estate Contract 
5 assigned to Stone by Welch. 
6|| Moreover, the affidavit of plaintiffs submitted in 
opposition to Welch's motion for Summary Judgment is in 
significant part a collection of conclusions and arguments, as 
opposed to as admissible facts, and so is insufficient under 
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Consequently, Welch 
has filed a separate motion to strike portions of plaintiffs' 
affidavit. 
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Argument 
I. 
The contract was forfeited in this 
case because the plaintiffs acted in 
accordance with their expressed intention 
to forfeit the buyer's interest. 
Plaintiffs cite only one case in their memorandum that 
involves an election to forfeit the buyer's interest under an 
installment real estate contract — Keesee v. Fetzek, 681 P.2d 
600 (Idaho App. 1984). They cite it for the proposition that 
absent prejudice to the buyer they are entitled to "change 
remedies" at any time, thereby avoiding the affects of their 
forfeiture of the buyer's interest under the terms of the 
Uniform Real Estate Code involved in this case. In so arguing, 
plaintiffs ignore the distinction expressly made in the Keesee 
-3-
12 
13 
1 
2 
3 case between the result when there has been a mere expression 
4 of an intent to defaultr" which will bind the electing seller 
5 only if relied upon by the buyer to his prejudice, and the 
6 actual forfeiture of the contract by an act in accordance with 
7 the express intention, which without more terminates the 
8|| contract and forfeits the buyer's interest. As the distinction 
drawn by the court in the Keesee case shows, a seller cannot 
10 act in accordance with his expressed intention to forfeit 
11|| without being bound by it. By acting in accordance with his 
expressed intention the seller executes the forfeiture.
 <Id. at 
605. 
"II In Keesee, the seller sent a notice of default to the 
15|| buyer which stated that if the buyer's default was not cured 
within the time provided, that the seller had elected to 
terminate the contract. When the default was not cured, the 
seller did not demand possession and did not demand return of 
the documents held in escrow under the terms of the real estate 
contract. Instead, the seller filed suit seeking judgment for 
the unpaid balance. Iji. at 602. Under these circumstances the 
court held that the seller would not be bound to his expressed 
intention to forfeit, absent prejudice to the buyer who had 
remained in possession of the property. But, the language in 
Keesee makes it plain that under the facts present here the 
Keesee court would conclude that the contract had been 
16 
17 
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311 forfeited because the plaintiffs here went beyond a mere 
4 expression of intention to forfeit, and in fact completed the 
5 forfeiture by their conduct. 
6 In distinguishing, Ellis v. Butterfield, 570 P.2d 334 
7 (Idaho 1977), where the seller was held to have forfeited the 
8 buyer's interest, the Keesee court said: 
9 Ellis is factually distinguishable from the 
instance case in regard to the relationship between 
10 the notices given to the buyers and the sellers' 
conduct thereafter. Our research reveals that the 
11 Ellis notice stated, in part: 
12 [The sellers are] giving you thirty days 
written notice of intention to terminate 
13 our agreement of sale for failure to pay 
installments due. If all back payments are 
14 not made within thirty days, we will 
terminate this contract and have you 
15 removed from the property. [Clerk's Record 
at 20.] 
16 
That notice, like the notice given in the present 
17 case, referred to a future act by the sellers. In 
Ellis such action was taken — escrow papers were 
18 withdrawn and possession was demanded. The 
forfeiture was complete. But in the present case, 
19|| there was no such action by the sellers. They 
decided to seek other remedies in court. 
20 
21 
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The facts in this case are like those in Ellis. In this 
case the plaintiffs have also acted on their expressed 
intention to forfeit. Indeed, in this case plaintiffs' acts go 
beyond those described by the Keesee court as being sufficient 
in Ellis. In addition to sending a notice of default,^ 
terminating the escrow and demanding possession, the plaintiffs 
here actually took possession of the property. Significantly, 
1 21 
3 the only remedy under the contract under which the plaintiffs 
4 could take possession without suit was by forfeiture. 
5 Moreoverf unlike the Keesee case, here there has been 
6 prejudice to buyer's interest as a result of the plaintiffs' 
7 conduct. As a matter of law, Welch and the other assignors and 
8 assignees of the buyer's interest were prejudiced when the 
9 plaintiffs took possession of the property and began collecting 
10 the rents. Nothing could be more contrary and injurious to the 
11 buyer's ownership interest in the property. 
12 A word also needs to be said about the plaintiffs1 
13 quotation from the Jacobsen case cited as being at 79 Cal. 
14 Rptr. 301 (1969). There is no Jacobsen case at that citation 
15|| or elsewhere in that volume of the California Reporter. There 
is, however, a case containing the language quoted which is 
styled Ganther v. Johnson, 79 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1969). But the 
16 
17 
18 quotation apparently taken from the Johnson case is out of 
19 
20 
21 
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26 
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context in two senses. First, it is a quotation from the 
headnote prepared by the reporting service and not from the 
text of the case itself. Second, it is misleading because the 
Johnson case did not involve a situation where the seller had 
even so much as expressed an intention to forfeit the buyer's 
interest. Instead, the seller had from the beginning expressed 
his intention that the buyers would be bound by the contract 
and that the seller always considered the contract to be in 
-6-
1 
21 
3 effect, ^d. at 385. The sellers in Johnson were in possession 
4 by reason of their having purchased an interest in the 
5 property, not pursuant of any declaration of forfeiture or 
6 | termination of the purchase contract. 
7 
81 II. 
9 Plaintiffs cannot negotiate a new agreement 
directly with Welch's assignee, and still hold Welch 
10 responsible under the terms of the original agreement, 
11 Plaintiffs take the novel position, without citing any 
12|| authority, that they can negotiate a new agreement with a 
13 buyer's assignee (Stone in this case), without releasing the 
14 buyer (Welch in this case) from the old agreement. Plaintiffs 
15 assert there was no harm to Welch by the increase in the 
16 purchase price Stone was to pay and the other changes under the 
17 new agreement because they say Welch's obligation continued 
18 
under the old agreement and so was not changed. Plaintiffs 
1911 
misperceive both the effect of the change in the terms of the 
20 J J agreement and the nature of Welch's obligations as an 
assignor. 
Welch was prejudiced by the changes, whether or not 
personally obligated, because the changes made Stone's 
performance more burdensome and increased the likelihood that 
251 j he would default. Stone was obviously having difficulty paying 
2011
 the original balance due, let alone a balance increased by 
271 
281 -7-
1
221 
23 
24 
1 
21 
3II another $10,000. The cases cited in Welch's opening memorandum 
4|| support this view and the 'soundness of it is also supported by 
5 principles of logic and fairness. 
6 Furthermore, an assignor's liability depends on the 
7 continued existence of the contract he assigned as between the 
8 seller and the assignee or some subsequent assignee. When the 
9 seller negotiates a new agreement with the assignee or a 
10 subsequent assignee, the original contract is replaced and the 
11 assignors link to the transaction and the assignee is broken, 
12n The privity of contract on which the assignor's liability 
13 depended ceases to exist. When that privity of contract was 
14 destroyed by plaintiffs1 negotiation of a new agreement with 
15 Stone, Welch could no longer be held responsible for Stone's 
16 default. Upon negotiating a new agreement with Stone, as 
17 assignee or otherwise, the plaintiffs expressed a willingness 
18 to look to Stone alone in the event of default and thus must 
19 look only to him for recovery of any default. Corbin on 
20 Contracts $ 866 at p. 458. 
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DATED this 2nd day of June, 1989. 
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER 
Thomas R. Vuksinick 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Thomas K. Welch 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that the foregoing Reply to Plaintiffs' 
Memorandum in Objection to Defendant Welch's Motion for Summary 
Judgment was served upon the parties hereto by mailing a true 
copy thereof, postage prepaid, this 2nd day of June, 1989, to 
the following: 
Dale M. Dorius, Esq. 
P. 0. Box U 
29 South Main Street 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Donald C. Hughes, Jr. 
520 26th Street, Suite 206 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendant Paul W. Stone 
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JUN 061989 
DALE M. DORIUS 
Attorney at Law 
L. R. Gardiner, Jr. (A-1148) 
Thomas R. Vuksinick (A-3341) 
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER 
50 South Main Street 
Eighth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144 
Telephone: (801) 533-0066 
Attorneys for Defendant Thomas K. Welch 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
NICK FAULKNER and KARYL ) 
FAULKNER, his wife, 
vs. 
TOM C. 
STONE i 
THOMAS 
vs. 
PAUL W 
Plaintiffs, 
THORPE, PAUL 
and THOMAS K. 
Defendants. 
K. WELCH, 
W. ) 
WELCH, ) 
Cross-plaintiff, ) 
. STONE, 
Cross-defendant. ) 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION TO STRIKE 
PLAINTIFFS' AFFIDAVIT IN 
SUPPORT OF THEIR OBJECTION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 2698-88 
1 
21 
3 
4|j Paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' affidavit should be stricken 
because it fails to state facts as required by 
511 Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
6 Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure/ requires that 
7 affidavits submitted in opposition to a motion for summary 
8 judgment "be made on personal knowledge# shall set forth such 
9 facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall 
10 affirmatively show that the affiant is competent t6 testify to 
11 the matters stated therein.11 Conclusory affidavits are 
12 insufficient/ and inadmissible hearsay and opinion testimony 
13 should not be set forth in the affidavit. Albrecht v. Uranium 
14 Services/ Inc., 596 P.2d 1025/ 1026 (Utah 1979); Walker v. 
15 Rocky Mountain Recreation Corporation/ 508 P.2d 538/ 542 (Utah 
16 1973). 
17 Generalized and conclusory affidavits in opposition to a 
18 motion for summary judgment cannot create a genuine factual 
19 dispute that will preclude summary judgment. Citizens1 
20 Environmental Counsel v. Volpe/ 484 F.2d 870/ 873 (10th Cir. 
21 1973)/ cert denied/ 416 US 936 (1974). The averment of a legal 
22 conclusion can never create an issue of fact. Boothe v. 
23 Hickel/ 347 F. Supp. 1273/ 1276 (D. Nev. 1969)/ cert denied/ 
24 414 U.S. 828 (1973). 
25 Paragraph 5 of plaintiffs1 affidavit submitted in" 
26 objection to Defendant Welch's Motion for Summary Judgment is 
27 
28 -2-
1 
2 
3 comprised almost entirely of conclusory statements, legal 
4 conclusions, and inadmissible hearsay and opinion evidence more 
5 akin to arguments one would expect to find in a memorandum than 
6 the specific factual statements required by Rule 56(e) 
7|| Accordingly, all of paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' affidavit should 
be stricken for failure to meet the requirements of Rule 56(e), 
9 I except plaintiffs1 admission that they entered into possession 
10 I of the subject real property. 
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II 
To the extent paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' affidavit 
controls plaintiffs1 earlier statement that they 
received documents from escrow, it is insufficient. 
In paragraph 5 of the plaintiffs' affidavit they state 
that "plaintiffs have never received titled back from the 
I'll escrow." In plaintiffs' memorandum submitted in objection to 
Welch's motion, in apparent reliance on the plaintiffs' 
affidavit, plaintiffs state that they did not receive any 
documents of title or contract from the escrow holder. See 
page 3 of Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Objection to Welch's Motion 
for Summary Judgment submitted in objection. However, in 
response to Interrogatory No. 3 of Defendant Welch's First Set 
of Interrogatories, plaintiffs stated under oath that they 
actually received the documents which were in escrow at about 
the time they sent the notice of default and forfeiture to 
-3-
1 
2 
' Welch when he defaulted under the original Uniform Real Estate 
* Contract in early 1982. Plaintiffs' answer to Interrogatory 
*|[ No. 3 of Welch's first set of interrogatories is attached 
hereto. 
•j| Paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' affidavit should be stricken to 
°J| the extent it may be construed to be inconsistent with the 
9 
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earlier answer to Interrogatory No. 3. , See Webster v. Sill, 
675 P.2d 1170 (Utah 1983) (A party may not rely on a subsequent 
affidavit that contradicts his prior deposition testimony to 
create an issue of fact on a motion for summary judgment unless 
there is some substantial likelihood that the prior deposition 
testimony was in error or that the party is able to state in 
his affidavit an adequate explanation for the contradictory 
answer in his deposition). 
DATED t h i s ^ day of June, 1989. 
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER 
/ 
L.VRI X^xjiinet, Jr. 
Thomas R. Vuksinick 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Thomas K. Welch 
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This is to certify that the foregoing Memorandum in 
Support of Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Affidavit in Support of 
their Objection to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment was 
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postage prepaid, this p< day of June 1989, to the following: 
Dale M. Dorius, Esq. 
P. 0. Box U 
.. 29 South Main Street 
"ll Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Donald C. Hughes, Jr. 
520 26th Street, Suite 206 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendant Paul W. Stone 
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Attorney at Law 
L. R. Gardiner, Jr . (A-1148) 
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50 South Main Street 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
NICK FAULKNER and KARYL ) 
FAULKNER, his wife, ) 
vs. 
TOM C. 
STONE , 
THOMAS 
vs. 
PAUL W 
Plaintiffs, ) 
THORPE, PAUL W. ) 
and THOMAS K. WELCH, ) 
Defendants. ) 
K. WELCH, ) 
Cross-plaintiff, ) 
. STONE, ) 
Cross-defendant. ) 
MOTION FOR ORDER STRIKING 
PORTIONS OF PLAINTIFFS' 
AFFIDAVIT IN OBJECTION TO 
DEFENDANT WELCH'S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 2698-88 
Defendant Thomas K. Welch moves the court for an order 
striking all of paragraph 5 of plaintiffs' affidavit submitted 
in support of plaintiffs' objection to the moving defendants' 
motion for summary judgment, except the portion of the 
1 
21 31 41 
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12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
241 
25 
26 
27 
28 
affidavit where plaintiffs admit they took possession of the 
property subject to the Uniform Real Estate Contract involved 
here, on the ground that paragraph 5 fails to satisfy the 
requirements of Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, in 
that it fails to set forth facts as would be admissible in 
evidence, and instead states conclusions, including legal 
conclusions, not supported by facts, and on the further grounds 
set forth in the accompanying memorandum. 
DATED this(~^, day of June, 1989. 
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER 
L/'JK^Gafdiner, Jr 
Thomas R. Vuksinick 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Thomas K. Welch 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that the foregoing Motion for Order 
Striking Portion of Plaintiffs' Affidavit in Objection to 
Defendant Welch's Motion for Summary Judgment was served upon 
the parties hereto by mailing a true copy thereof, postage 
prepaid, this p ^ day of June, to the following: 
.. Dale M. Dorius, Esq. 
1°|| P. 0. Box U 
.. 29 South Main Street 
11|| Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Donald C. Hughes, Jr. 
520 26th Street, Suite 206 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Attorney for Defendant Paul W. Stone 
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